Public declarations made by and on behalf of the Sahrawi people apropos their 'secularism' and 'religious tolerance' must therefore be viewed not only in relation to the current geo-political (in)security context and intensified rejection of Islam in the West, but also more localized concerns about an 'Islamically dominated North Africa', 'Islamic fundamentalism' in the Saharan desert and Maghreb (see Keenan 2004; Zoubir 2002) , and the purported emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (see Darbouche 2007: 2; del Pino 2003) . Directly opposed to these characterizations of the region as inherently imbued with threats and danger, the Polisario and its supporters explicitly present the Sahrawi as fulfilling all the non-economic priorities associated with contemporary notions of 'good governance' ('peaceful', 'secular' and 'democratic') , and therefore as a prototypical example to be followed by other actors in the international arena (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014) . The Polisario have therefore successfully projected the Sahrawi camps as 'ideal' spaces inhabited by 'good' refugees, in part by reflecting mainstream European normative preferences for the development of a 'good' and 'progressive' Islam. In some instances, this has led to the purposeful distancing of the Sahrawi Self from Islam and specific religious symbols, three of which I shall discuss in the remainder of this paper: mosques, madrasas and the milhafa.
Before turning to the ways in which these symbols have been 'veiled' by the Polisario, it is important to reassert that this representational strategy must be viewed in relation to the Polisario's dependence upon aid provided by external actors, and in particular the material significance of Sahrawi refugees' connections with civil society groups which cannot be understated: the World Food Programme identifies the camps' "very vulnerable households" as those which "had not built any contacts with the civil societies of Spain and of other countries that provide support to refugee families" (WFP 2008, 3 my emphasis) . It is this palpable connection and physical proximity to the people who provide them with much needed material and financial assistance, alongside social capital, which leads the Polisario, as well as many Sahrawi families, to recognize the significance of the solidarity network, in contrast with the less visible, and more taken-for-granted humanitarian projects which are, according to my research, marginalized in both the popular and the "national" imagination.
European Visitors and Invisible Mosques and Madrasas in the Sahrawi Refugee Camps
The international celebration of the Sahrawi refugee camps' success is, in many ways and through many means, directly associated with and even dependent upon the concealment, or discursive minimization, of everyday Muslim identity, practice and institutions (FiddianQasmiyeh 2010a (FiddianQasmiyeh , 2014 . For instance, although European and North American humanitarian and political visitors to the camps are typically taken by official Sahrawi guides on a 'tourist route' of 'secular' Sahrawi institutions including the National Parliament and National Hospital, buildings associated with Islam, such as the camps' established mosques, are in fact excluded from such tours.
One of the clearest examples of this policy's success is that many visitors, including journalists and humanitarian visitors Brazier (1997) , Ryan (1999) , Bryant (2004) , and Thorne (2004) have all erroneously declared that there are "no mosques" in the camps. My own interactions with Spanish solidarios in the 27 February Camp indicate that the majority of these were unaware that the yellow and green building facing the entrance to the National Women's School was a mosque (see Figure 1) . "The Veiling of Religious Markers in the Sahrawi Diaspora," in J. Garnett and S. Hale (eds) When I informed them of its purpose, many Spaniards who had visited the camps on numerous occasions were confused by its existence, with one Canary Islander asking me "but... why do they have a mosque here?" (27 February Camp, April 2007) .
Indeed, a further example of the Polisario/SADR's apparent success in hiding the Sahrawi's religion includes Cazón's reference to a Spanish host family who had been "in solidarity" with the Sahrawi for over a decade before "discovering" that the Sahrawi are Muslim. After the Spanish host mother was reportedly warned by a Sahrawi man to "remember that we, the Sahrawis, are also moros" (2004, 59 ; my translation), she laments: "That man was right. The religion of the Sahrawis is the same as that of the moros" (ibid., 95; my translation). Her shock that the man was correct that Sahrawis are, after all, Muslims suggests that in her imagination, as in many other Spaniards' minds, the Sahrawi were until then not truly associated with Muslim identity and practice.
In addition to the "invisible" mosques in the camps, Polisario/SADR and Western accounts have also repeatedly failed to document the existence of "modern religious schools" (madrasas) which are attended by students interested in expanding their knowledge of Islam following, or in parallel to, their "national" education in the camps (Gimeno- Martín and Laman 2005, 23) . Despite the SADR Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs having authorized the creation of two Qur'anic schools in Aaiun, Smara and Dakhla, and one in Ausserd (ibid, 32), these schools are not labelled and heralded as "national" institutions by the Polisario/SADR, and are therefore rarely explicitly made visible to Western visitors.
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It is admittedly the case that the mosques and religious schools established in each refugee camp are not frequented by the majority of camp inhabitants (as is the case in many if not most MENA countries), and access to institutionalized forms of practicing Islam and learning the Qur'an is mainly limited to those who can afford to pay the relevant fee. Nonetheless, it is common to see Sahrawi refugees praying in their tents or in open spaces, and numerous children attend extracurricular Qur'anic classes. Furthermore, the presence of SADR jeeps outside of the 27 February Camp mosque during Friday Prayer indicates that some such Polisario/SADR offcials attend these same mosques, despite habitually rendering them "invisible" to Western visitors to the camps.
In addition to the 'invisibilisation' of mosques and madrasas during official tours of the camps, the milhafa is a third major religious symbol which is concealed despite its apparent visibility to external observers. Examining 'the veiling' of 'the Sahrawi veil' will enable us to examine how and why the Polisario has engaged in this particular representational strategy vis-avis public and private Sahrawi religious symbols.
Veiling and Unveiling the Milhafa in the Sahrawi Diaspora
2 It is not my intention to characterize camp life either solely or primarily in religious terms, but rather to briefly note that a heterogeneity of religious practice and belief exists amongst different groups of Sahrawi refugees, varying according to multiple factors, including refugees' generation and an exposure to different approaches to Islam through the study abroad programme. This is a multiplicity which is rendered invisible by the official discourse projected to European solidarios, and yet is a highly significant reality in the camps. "The Veiling of Religious Markers in the Sahrawi Diaspora," in J. Garnett and S. Hale (eds) Religion in Diaspora: Cultures of Citizenship, London: Palgrave Macmillan, Throughout my research with Sahrawi youth and adults in the Sahrawi refugee camps and further afield in Cuba, Spain, Syria and South Africa, a selection of common claims 3 were systematically made vis-à-vis Sahrawi women's situation in the refugee camps: "not being veiled," having freedom of movement, and not only being able to divorce freely and "unilaterally," but even celebrating this event via a "divorce party". Although I have examined the centrality of this intersecting set of mutually reinforcing images and conceptualizations which re/create Sahrawi refugee women as uniquely liberal, secular and empowered refugee women for particular political purposes during interactions with humanitarian donors elsewhere (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014) , in the remainder of this paper I will focus on the first of these elements: that of Sahrawi women "not being veiled".
In the case under consideration, the Polisario's mainstream representation of Sahrawi refugee women's position and identity in the camps is founded upon the separation of Sahrawi women from Other Muslim women in the "Arab World," with a particular reliance on creating and maintaining a distance from Islam and religious identity for strategic reasons. The portrayal of the long piece of fabric (the milhafa) which loosely covers the head and body of Sahrawi women in the camps 4 therefore emerges as a highly politicized one which I consider to be part of the Sahrawi's broader "politics of survival", providing a further example of the ways in which religious symbols are mobilised (or in this case invisibilised) by state and non-state actors to ensure the continuation of humanitarian networks which are explicitly or implicitly based on non-economic conditionalities and geopolitical preferences vis-à-vis 'good' and 'bad' Islam. 
29-year-old male Biology student, Havana, November 2006, my translation
The veil has so frequently been centrally positioned in Western analyses (and historically, in Western colonial projects), that it is unsurprising that descriptions of Sahrawi refugee women, qua Muslim women, should also include references to veiling. Fanon's identification and analysis of French colonizers' "precise political doctrine" to "unveil" Algerian women as a means of conquering the colonized society (Fanon 1965, 37-38) have been the foundation of much feminist post-colonial work which has examined Orientalist representations of both the veil (i.e. Lewis 2003; El-Guindi 2003; and Woodhull 2003) , and the extent to which unveiling women has frequently become a "convenient instrument for signifying many issues at once, i.e. the construction of modern [national] identity" (Yegenoglu 1998, 132) . In certain historical contexts, we are reminded, the veil has "carried connotations of Muslim backwardness" both in the eyes of Western Orientalists and MENA nationalists (ibid). Indeed, as stressed by Kandiyoti (1991) and Yegenoglu (1998, 135) with reference to Atatürk's reforms in Turkey, processes of unveiling women as a means of demonstrating the "marginalization" or displacement of Islam have historically been central to the development of "secular" modern nationalist discourses. Contemporary popular and political debates concerning the place of veiling in "secular" European states have emerged as a result of many Muslim girls and women, as well as their families and broader communities, demanding that Muslim women should have the right to wear the veil (be this the hijab, chador or niqab) in schools -both as students and as teachers -and other public places. Major disputes have taken place since the late-1980s in European countries including France, 5 Spain 6 and the United Kingdom. 7 The veil in the aforementioned analyses has often been identified as being the most visible (or public) sign of difference between Muslim and Western societies, with such "difference" being negatively evaluated by Western audiences, who have directly equated the veil with the oppression of women, and often claimed that (neo)colonial intervention has been necessary to save "brown women from brown men" (Spivak 1993, 93) .
In more recent popular debates in Western and non-Western states, many Muslim women and men have framed "veiling" within a discourse of rights, arguing that the veil can enable and empower women rather than unequivocally "oppress" them (Hoodfar 1991; Zuhur 1992) . In these and other historical and contemporary cases, veiling has often become a symbol of personal, communal and national resistance and identity, directly opposing ethnocentric and Orientalist assumptions, stereotypes and "unveiling" desires. Importantly, the personal, religious, social and political significance of the veil for Muslim women and their communities has not been denied or rejected, but rather emphasized, by those who argue that girls and women should have the right to veil, if they so wish.
In a radically divergent approach to the direct confrontation to and rejection of essentialist (mis)understandings of the veil, the mainstream discourse projected by the Polisario/SADR to Western observers with regards to Sahrawi women is permeated with claims that, unlike other Arab/Muslim women, they "did not veil" either during, before or after the colonial era. Hence, in his Sahrawi novel/historiography, the Polisario/SADR representative to the Middle East discusses the position of Sahrawi women during the colonial era, stating that "she does not veil" (Kuttab, 2002, 63 ) ("hiya la tatahajjab," where hajaba is the Arabic root of the verb "to conceal" or "to veil", Qasmiyeh's translation). Equally, like other visitors to the camps, Harrell-Bond was told by informants during her visit in the 1980s that "Our women were never veiled and they always worked" (1999, 156) , and, following an interview with Zahra Ramdan (executive member of the Polisario's Women's Union and its Spanish-based International Relations representative), Feo also indicates that "the Sahrawi woman is not obliged to veil" (2003, my translation) . Such official accounts of Sahrawi women "not veiling" either in the past or in the present appear to be largely incongruous on many levels (see Figure  2 ). 
First and foremost, it is "unthinkable" for a Sahrawi woman not to wear the milhafa in the camps, as young women returning from studying in Cuba have encountered upon their arrival (Fiddian 2002) . During their studies in Algeria, on the other hand, young Sahrawi women tend to wear headscarves, rather than the milhafa, as demonstrated in photographs shown by many of my female informants in the camps. Further, although many Sahrawi women living in the diaspora in the Canary Islands and other parts of Spain continue to wear the milhafa, others decide to either wear headscarves or leave their heads uncovered (personal observations, 2001-2010) . In contrast, in the Algerian-based refugee camps, all women wear the milhafa, although the way in which it is worn varies throughout women's life-cycles, with older women veiling less strictly than younger, fertile and supposedly more attractive women (also see Mernissi 2003b, 493). The milhafa is therefore directly related to curtailing the risk of fitna (temptation or its related chaos), with older women seen as being less "tempting" to men than their younger counterparts. This move towards "looser" or more "relaxed" veiling with age is in line with sura 24:60, which indicates that women who are "past the age of bearing children" and "have no hope of marriage" may even "take off their outer garments," although they should remain modestly clothed and "not display their charms."
Clear confirmation that the milhafa should be considered to be a veil is derived from one of my research visits to the camps (2007) . Given that all Sahrawi women wear the milhafa in the camps, upon my arrival I was clearly dressed in a different fashion to the majority of women there, but I still considered myself to be "modestly covered" since I was wearing a headscarf and loose-fitting long-sleeved shirts and trousers. Whilst living, working and conducting research in other countries with majority Muslim populations, this had even been sufficient to enter mosques which required non-Muslims to observe/respect veiling requirements (such as the Al-Azhar mosque in Cairo). Many women and girls in the camps, however, clearly did not consider me to be "covered," with adolescent girls in particular repeatedly asking me "Why aren't you muhajjaba?" (veiled, f. sing.). On several occasions during my first weeks in the camps I was confronted quite aggressively by three older women (between their late-50s and early-60s) on this matter. Whilst they, like many older (usually post-menopausal) women in the camps, wore relatively loose-fitting and "revealing" malahif (pl. of milhafa), frequently with only a "skimpy" top underneath which allowed their arms and shoulders to be seen, they were adamant that I, like all other young women in the camps, should be muhajjaba.
After a short time in the camps, I eventually decided to wear the milhafa rather than a headscarf, resulting in older women immediately ceasing to challenge me on this matter. Equally, the young girls (who I believe were expressing more widely-held views) instantly stopped asking me why I was not muhajjaba. This direct cessation of daily confrontations demonstrated that, for these adult women and female children alike, the milhafa is clearly a form of hijab, or veil, and, further, that in their opinion women should be muhajjabat (veiled, f. pl.) .
It may appear self-evident that the milhafa is a traditional item which fulfils common interpretations of the Qur'anic requirements of veiling/covering, and therefore should be understood as a "veil," and yet conventional Sahrawi representations of this item of clothing to Westerners both in the camps and in Spain purport to distance the milhafa from religious obligations or connotations, even overtly declaring, as indicated above, that Sahrawi women "do not veil." "The Veiling of Religious Markers in the Sahrawi Diaspora," in J. Garnett and S. Hale (eds) Religion in Diaspora: Cultures of Citizenship, London: Palgrave Macmillan, In effect, Western observers are often informed by Sahrawi men and women that the milhafa is a traditional or national item of clothing, rather than a religiously-motivated one. This is reflected in the response offered by Khira Mohamed, a young Spanish-educated Sahrawi doctor based in Spain at the time of her interview, when asked by an El País journalist if she had ever worn 'el velo' (the veil): In all of these descriptions, which are based on visits to the camps and interviews with Spanish-speaking Sahrawis there, the milhafa appears as a traditional dress, 8 making no reference to which parts of the body it covers, and, in Sanz's case, vaguely describing it to the reader as a "tunic." In other cases, Sahrawi women are described as being "wrapped in colored saris" (AFP, 2004, my emphasis) . Such an understanding of the milhafa clearly makes no connection to any possible religious motivations or requirements, with references to Sahrawi women's Muslim identity either being entirely absent or marginal in these pieces. This representation fails, for instance, to recognize that Sahrawi women who attend the mosque on Fridays ideally wear a newly washed milhafa when they do so, and all women carefully adjust their malahif before praying to ensure that their heads and hair are covered accordingly (personal observations, 27 February Camp, March-May 2007). Indeed, not only do Sahrawi refugee women "veil," but the typical assumption in the camps is that all Muslim women are Islamically obliged to wear some sort of veil (despite Khira Mohamed's declaration to the contrary), 9 and that if they are Sahrawi women, they should specifically wear the milhafa. Although I have elsewhere explored the diverse ways in which the official discourse creates and maintains a distance from Islam (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010a , 2011b , 2014 , what is of interest in the context of this chapter is the separation which is created by the Polisario, for a Western audience, between "the veil" and the milhafa. articles mentioned above, by simply using the term "veil" rather than explaining whether the author is referring to a chador, niqab, jilbab or hijab, not only are the various types of "veils" worn by different Muslim women elided, but so too is the significance of the terms "veiled" and "unveiled."
El-Guindi's discussion of the significance of the veil in two case studies of Muslim feminism is particularly relevant at this point. With reference to a "public political feminist act" in which Sha'rawi "unveiled ceremonially," El-Guindi reminds us that
The phrase used in the discourse surrounding the context of lifting the 'veil' was raf' alhigab (the lifting of the hijab). Ironically, what secular feminists lifted was the traditional face veil (burqu'), which is rooted in cultural tradition and history rather than Islamic sources, not the hijab ... When Huda Sha'rawi dramatically cast off the veil in 1923, it was the face veil she removed, not the hijab.
2003, 596
As this case clearly demonstrates, it is possible to "remove the veil" and yet "remain veiled," since there are different degrees and forms of veiling which Muslim women may don. Such insights appear to be absent from Graham-Brown's usage of the term "unveiled" in the caption which accompanies a late-nineteenth century photograph of three women in Egypt:
The unveiled woman in the foreground, gazing directly at the camera, is contrasted with the two veiled women in the background... However, she draws her head-veil slightly across her face in the presence of the man behind the camera.
2003, 507 my emphasis
As indicated in the caption itself, "the unveiled woman" is in fact wearing a "head-veil," and the briefest examination of the photograph demonstrates that the term "unveiled" refers solely to the absence of a face veil, since the three women are all wearing loose cloths which cover their bodies, necks, heads and foreheads. It is thus precisely through recognizing the different ways in which "veiling" and "unveiling" can be conceptualized, and by asking who and what Sahrawi women and the milhafa are being compared with when Spanish solidarios, journalists and academics declare that they "did not [or do not] veil," that we can best understand the official Sahrawi representation apropos veiling in the camps. Hence, if compared with certain groups of Bedouin women who wear faceveils, or Muslim women who wear the niqab or burqa, it might be valid to note that Sahrawi women did not, and do not, cover their faces (major exceptions being when women protect their faces from the sun or the sand). Such an understanding is offered by the Cuban-based MA student quoted above, who claimed that the only Arab women who "do not cover their faces or hands" are Mauritanian and Sahrawi women who wear the milhafa. During our interview, he continued by (equally unfoundedly) stating that "in other places in the Arab world, you can only see the woman's eyes," leading us to recognize that, if one considers face-veiling to be "veiling" per se, one might in fact reach the conclusion that Sahrawi women "did not veil" in the past or "do not veil" in the present.
The above discussion does not purport to claim that all analysts or visitors to the camps consider Sahrawi women to be "unveiled." Yet many observers who accept that Sahrawi women "use the veil as ordered in the Qur'an" often rely on interviews with women who report that even if do they veil, they do so "with a great deal of tenderness" and as a sign "of identity and pride" (Petrich 2005, my translation) . Claims to this effect were made during several of my interviews with Spanish solidarity workers and visitors in the camps. By including these quotations and references, the Western observer is immediately led to contrast the Sahrawi milhafa with the ways that Other Muslim women veil: if Sahrawi women unequivocally embrace their identityenforcing milhafa with "tenderness," we are led to understand that non-Sahrawi Muslim women are violently forced to wear the veil against their will.
12 Accordingly, "other Muslim women" must experience this practice as a violent curtailment of their rights, and have their identity and pride subjugated as a result.
In conclusion, while the milhafa may, as a matter of fact, be a traditional item of clothing, and whilst it is admittedly neither a hijab (qua headscarf) nor a niqab or burqa, the milhafa is nevertheless a "veil" in religious terms. As indicated earlier, nationalist movements have often promoted the "unveiling" of women in an attempt to both distance themselves from Islam and to create a "secular" (and therefore "modern") national identity. This leads us to question the determination with which Polisario/SADR spokespeople have distanced themselves from the veil as a visible sign of Muslim identity in their portrayals of Sahrawi womanhood both in the camps and in Spain, just as they have rendered mosques and madrasas invisible in the camps. I would suggest that by doing so, the Polisario's official discourse not only fails to confront ethnocentric understandings of both the veil and Islam, but is rather simultaneously based on, and in fact reproduces and solidifies such rhetoric for strategic reasons which are intimately related to the Sahrawi politics of survival, and the politics of humanitarianism in this protracted refugee context.
Concluding Remarks
As the Polisario/SADR is acutely aware, the potential to alienate Western solidarity groups, upon whom Sahrawi refugees physically and politically depend, is an ever-present possibility. In a context where the negative representation of Islam (and the position of women within Islam) by the media and politicians throughout the West prevails, distancing the Sahrawi Self from Islam appears to be strategic in nature, and intimately related to the Polisario/SADR's politics of survival. Whilst historically characterizing many nationalist movements in the past, separating the Sahrawi Self from Islam becomes increasingly urgent given the current geo-political setting and related rejection of Islam in the West. Combined with more localized concerns about an "Islamically dominated North Africa," and "Islamic fundamentalism" in the Saharan desert and Maghreb, the prospect of creating a secular, modern state is an attractive one actively offered by proponents of Sahrawi selfdetermination to non-Sahrawi audiences (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011a) . Importantly, public declarations made by and on behalf of the Polisario must be viewed in relation not only to global shifts in the 1990s and 2000s, but also more specifically vis-a-vis high-profile (and thus far unsubstantiated) accusations made by Moroccan officials that the Polisario Front is a terrorist organisation tied to Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (Darbouche 2007:2; del Pino 2003) . The kidnapping of Spanish and Italian NGO workers from the administrative capital of the Sahrawi refugee camps (Rabouni) in October 2011, purportedly by members of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, reignited such accusations, which have in turn been vehemently opposed by the Polisario and Sahrawi refugees in the camps and across Spain.
Such public declarations include that of a Spanish solidario who addressed the UN General Assembly in 2007, declaring that a free Western Sahara "could be an example for the world," "peaceful, respectful of women, freedom-loving, and allied in the struggle against terrorism" (UNGA 2007).
14 Zunes has also suggested that "having such a progressive and democratic model [in the form of an independent SADR] in the Arab-Islamic world may constitute what Noam Chomsky has called 'the threat of a good example'" (Mundy and Zunes 2002, n.p.) . In this way, the SADR directly posits itself as an example to be followed by other nations, fulfilling all of the non-economic priorities associated with contemporary notions of "good governance": "peaceful" = "democratic" = "secular."
In such a context, the term "secular" is both explicitly and implicitly invoked throughout Polisario and Spanish accounts of life in the camps. Such claims may be made indirectly by the Polisario and by Sahrawi individuals through distancing Sahrawi women from a range of Muslim identities and practices which are considered in the West to be oppressive. Indeed, as indicated above, the "unveiling" of women and officially distancing the national Self from the "Islamic veil" has frequently been interpreted as one of the clearest symbols of secularism (Gökanksel and Mitchell 2005; Kandiyoti 1991; Yegenoglu 1998, 135) . Furthermore, these claims have also been made explicitly by declaring that "our women do not veil" (op cit) and implicitly by 'veiling' the existence of mosques and madrasas in the camps, thereby portraying the camps as 'ideal' humanitarian spaces inhabited by 'ideal refugees' worthy of humanitarian and political support by 'secular' NGOs and civil society networks alike.
